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ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the issue of Salt Lake City's inclusion on

the special verdict form for apportionment of fault is moot.

The

jury determined that defendant was without fault and did not
reach the issue of the City's fault or any apportionment.
2.

Whether under Utah's Comparative Negligence

Statutes, non-parties are includable on the special verdict form,
for the purpose of apportioning fault.
is reviewed for correctness.

The trial court's ruling

Assay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135

(Utah 1988).
3.

Whether plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial

court's inclusion of Salt Lake City on the verdict form.

The

trial court's finding of no prejudice is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

Kelly v. Utah Power and Light, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah

App. 1987).
4.

Whether the trial court's refusal to allow

plaintiff to call a witness which plaintiff had failed to
designate on her court ordered witness list was an abuse of
discretion.

The trial court's rulings on admission or exclusion

of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Hardy v.

Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE 3TAT0TES
1.

Utah Comparative Negligence Statutes, Sections 78-

27-37 through 41:

78-27-37. Definitions. As used in Sections
78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune
from suit who is claimed to be liable because
of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of
legal duty, act, or omission proximately
causing or contributing to injury or damages
sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including, but not limited to, negligence in
all its degrees, contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach
of express or implied warranty of a product,
products liability, and misuse, modification
or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any
person seeking damages or reimbursement on
its own behalf, or on behalf of another for
whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. The fault
of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover
from any defendant or group of defendants
whose fault exceeds his own. However, no
defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total
damages and proportion of fault. The trial
court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find
separate special verdicts determining the
total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
78-27-40.
proportion
Subject to
amount for
any person
percentage

Amount of liability limited to
of fault—No contribution.
Section 78-27-38, the maximum
which a defendant may be liable to
seeking recovery is that
or proportion of the damages
2

equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No
defendant is entitled to contribution from
any other person.
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. A person
seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a
party to the litigation, may join as parties
any defendants who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of
fault.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below.
Plaintiff (appellant) Turner was involved in an
automobile accident with defendant (appellee) Nelson on July 6,
1989.

The only witness listed on the police report, Daniel Rusk,

observed that the stop sign controlling Nelson's direction of
travel was obscured by foliage.

Plaintiff did not make a claim

against the city within the statutory one-year period (Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-12).

Plaintiff filed this action against Nelson

nearly two years after the accident.

(Complaint, R. 2-4.)

Nelson's Answer denied negligence and claimed that a
third party was at fault (R. 9-11).

In her Answers to

Interrogatories filed in May 1991 and her deposition in July
1991, she explained that the stop sign was blocked.

At his

deposition taken in January of 1992, Daniel Rusk also testified
that the sign was obstructed.

(R. 738-39.)
3

Plaintiff pressed for an early trial setting,
representing to the Court that her discovery was complete.
23; 52-53; R. 62-63.)

(R.

The Court held a scheduling conference and

set a trial date of March 3, 1992. The Court ordered further
provided that exhibits and witness lists were to be exchanged no
later than February 14, 1992 with all discovery to be concluded
February 20, 1992.

(Scheduling Order, R. 68.)

Defendant filed her designation of witnesses in
accordance with the Court's Order.

(R. 94-95.)

her designation late, on February 19, 1992.

Plaintiff filed

(R. 97-98.)

At the pretrial settlement conference on February 21,
1992, defense counsel advised the Court and plaintiff's counsel
of his belief that Salt Lake City Corporation should be on the
jury verdict form for the purpose of apportioning its fault.
Plaintiff objected.

Subsequently, defendant made a formal motion

to include the City which was granted.

(R. 100-101; 358.)

Trial commenced on March 3, 1992 as scheduled.

On

March 4, 1992, plaintiff moved the Court for leave to offer a
previously unlisted witness, Jim Nakling.

(Motion, R. 143-45.)

Plaintiff represented that the witness would deny that the stop
sign was obstructed.

(Affidavit, R. 146-47.)

Plaintiff gave no

explanation for her failure to locate and identify this witness
within the time set by the Court's Order.
plaintiff's motion.
4

The court denied

Trial was concluded on March 5, 1992.
288-91.)

(Verdict, R.

The jury returned its verdict finding that plaintiff

was not negligent.

The jury did not reach the question of

whether or not Salt Lake City or plaintiff was negligent in
causing the accident.

Plaintiff's motion for a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict was denied (R. 297-98) and an order
entered dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as no cause of action.
(R. 294-95.)
FACT8 OF THE CLAIM
The accident occurred at the intersection of Third
Avenue and Canyon Road in Salt Lake City.

An approximate drawing

of the intersection follows:
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(Defendant's Exhibit 2.)

This was the T-type intersection.

However, unlike most

T-type intersections, the through-way of traffic was the stem of
the "T" (the direction that plaintiff was traveling), and not the
top of the lfTff (the direction that defendant was traveling) .

(R.

415-16; 437; 653-54.) Defendant had never been on the road or
through the intersection before.

(R. 686.)

The road on which defendant approached the intersection
is curved, making it impossible for her to have appreciated the
size and layout of the intersection until she was within 50 feet
of it.

(R. 417-18.)

There was a dispute in the evidence as to

whether or not there was a "stop ahead" sign in place to warn
defendant of the intersection.

(R. 394; 642; 649.)

Defendant did not see the stop sign until immediately
before she entered the intersection.

She applied her brakes when

she saw it but was unable to get completely stopped before the
accident.

(R. 331-32.)
Plaintiff was traveling west on 3rd Avenue approaching

the intersection.

Plaintiff originally testified that she was

going 30-35 miles an hour which was in excess of the speed limit.
(R. 618.)

At the time of trial, she testified that she was

going 15-20 miles an hour.

(R. 604.)

She also applied her

brakes and was almost able to stop before impact.

(R. 604.)

The

two cars had slowed to approximately 5 miles per hour at the time
of impact.

(R. 408; 683.)
6

Defendant testified that the stop sign was obscured by
trees and foliage as she approached it and was only capable of
being seen just before she entered the intersection,

(R. 335-

3 6.) Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the
witness, Rusk.

(R. 640.)

Plaintiff testified that she did not see any
obstruction to the stop sign.

(R. 608.)

She also presented a

police officer who was at the scene, Mickey Paul, who indicated
that he did not observe any obstruction of the stop sign (R. 434)
and an expert, Newell Knight, who testified based upon his
inspection of the accident scene that in his opinion the sign was
not obstructed.

(R. 398.)

The jury apparently found defendant and Mr. Rusk to be
more believable and concluded that defendant was not negligent.
In view of that conclusion, the jury did not reach the issue as
to plaintiff's negligence or the negligence of Salt Lake City.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Mootness—Plaintiff's appeal is based primarily

upon the inclusion of Salt Lake City on the special verdict form.
That issue is moot due to the fact that the jury found no
negligence on the part of defendant.
issue of apportioning fault.

They did not reach the

Even if Salt Lake City had not been

on the jury form, defendant would have been fully entitled to
7

argue that she was not at fault due to the obstruction of the
stop sign.

The same evidence would have been received and the

same arguments made.

The presence of Salt Lake City on the form

was inconsequential and, therefore, this issue is moot.
2.

The Statutory Scheme Provides for the Apportionment

of Fault to Non-Parties—The Utah comparative negligence statutes
specifically provide for the consideration of the fault of any
person who is claimed to be liable in causing the accident,,
Section 78-27-39 provides for the use of a special verdict form
which determines "the percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each
*defendant'."

As noted in plaintiff's brief, the word

"defendant" is specifically defined by Section 78-27-37 to be any
person who is claimed to have had fault in causing the injury, it
is not limited to parties.
The statutes, which were passed in 1986, eliminated the
previous scheme of a joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors as well as contribution actions.

They specifically

limited a defendant's liability to his particular proportion of
fault only.

(Section 78-27-38).

The inclusion of non-party tort-feasors is essential to
the statutory scheme.

Without such persons on the verdict form,

a defendant or plaintiff may be saddled with more than his
proportionate share of fault resulting in an improper result.
8

Plaintiff's argument that Section 78-27-41 changes the
entire approach of the statutes and requires that any person to
whom fault may be apportioned must be a party to the litigation
is a misreading of the statute and its overall intent.

That

section merely provides that a defendant may join a joint tortfeasor as a party to the litigation but does not require it.
Such a joinder may work to a defendant's benefit in order to
facilitate discovery or for other strategic purposes in handling
the lawsuit.

But the section is not mandatory and does not

change the basic statutory scheme.
3.

The Addition of salt Lake ^ity

to the Jury Form Did

Not Prejudice Plaintiff—Plaintiff waited more than one year
after the accident before commencing any litigation.

The statute

of limitations for a claim against Salt Lake City had run.
Whether Salt Lake City was joined as a defendant in this lawsuit
or not, made no difference to plaintiff because plaintiff could
not recover from Salt Lake City.
The key issues of fact in the case were unchanged by
adding Salt Lake City to the verdict form.

Plaintiff claimed

that the stop sign was visible to the defendant and she should
have stopped.

The defendant claimed that the stop sign was

obstructed.
As pointed out by Judge Frederick:

9

My decision to allow Salt Lake City on the
verdict form for the purpose of apportionment
of the responsibility here really does not
change the essential defense that the sign
was obstructed,
(R. 744.)
The facts and evidence were unchanged.

Plaintiff was

not caught unaware that defendant was claiming that the sign had
been obstructed.

Plaintiff had been aware of that claim from

early on in the case.

There was no new or surprise defense and,

therefore, no prejudice to plaintiff.
4.

Plaintiff Failed to Comply with the Court's Order

Regarding Identification of Witnesses and was Properly Precluded
From Bringing on a Surprise Witness in the Second Day of Trial—
The issue of foliage obstructing the stop sign had been known to
plaintiff no later than May 29, 1991 when defendant responded to
plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories.

Plaintiff began trial

with three witnesses on the obstruction issue:
police officer and her expert.

herself, the

On the second day of trial,

plaintiff's counsel advised the Court that he had found a fourth
witness and wanted to offer his testimony.
Plaintiff's attempt to bring on a new witness was in
violation of the Court's Scheduling Order.

Plaintiff's counsel

gave no explanation of why this witness was not located and
listed prior to trial.

Plaintiff suggested that the addition of

Salt Lake City to the verdict form had somehow changed the
10

factual issues in the case.

Judge Frederick properly rejected

this argument, pointing out that plaintiff had been aware of the
issue of obstruction of the stop sign from early on in the case
and had already presented several witnesses on the issue.
Judge Frederick enforced the Scheduling Order and
precluded the new witness.
The trial court's determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of that discretion.
(Utah App. 1989).

Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917

"The trial court does not abuse its discretion

in refusing to admit evidence which is not timely provided to the
opposing counsel contrary to the court's instructions."

Id. at

p. 925.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY
ON THE VERDICT FORM IS MOOT.
The jury determined that defendant was not negligent.
The jury did not reach the issue of whether or not plaintiff
herself was negligent or Salt Lake City was negligent.

In view

of the jury's determination, the issue of whether or not Salt
Lake City should be included on the jury verdict form is of no
consequence.
Plaintiff's attempt to suggest that the inclusion of
Salt Lake City on the verdict form in some way altered the facts,
11

evidence or argument of the case is incorrect.

Defendant's

position from the time of filing her answer in this case was that
she was not negligent.

In proving that position, she was

entitled to put on evidence to demonstrate her freedom from fault
and the fault of others.

Even if Salt Lake City had not been on

the verdict form, defendant would have made the same argument,
claiming that she was free of fault because the stop sign could
not be seen.
The inclusion or failure to include a non-party joint
tort-feasor on the verdict form is of no consequence when the
party at issue is found to have no negligence.
of Coeur d' Alene, 827 P.2d 1160 (Ida. 1992).
is analogous to the instant case.

Beitzel v. City
The Beitzel case

It involved a situation in

which a non-party was erroneously not included on the special
verdict form.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that since the

plaintiff was found to have no fault in the accident, the
inclusion or non-inclusion of the non-party on the verdict form
was irrelevant.
In the Beitzel case, the fact that plaintiff had no
negligence made the inclusion of non-parties on the special
verdict form irrelevant.

Similarly, in the instant case, the

fact that defendant was found to be free of negligence makes the
inclusion or lack of inclusion of Salt Lake City on the special
verdict form irrelevant and moot.
12

POINT II
THE INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY ON THE VERDICT FORM IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTES.
The applicable Utah comparative negligence statutes
were enacted in 1986 as the Tort Reform Act.

The Act eliminated

contribution between joint tort-feasors and established a system
under which no defendant is liable for more than her respective
share of fault.

(§ 78-27-38 U.C.A.)

In order to effectuate the

purpose and scheme of the Act, it is necessary to include all of
the persons or entities who share in the fault, not just those
who happen to be parties to the case.
The Act uses a special definition of the word
"defendant" to include "any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery."

(§ 78-27-37(1) U.C.A.)

There is no requirement that

a "defendant" be an actual party to the lawsuit.

This expansive

definition includes non-party joint tort-feasors.
The Legislature specifically directs how special
verdict forms should be structured in Section 78-27-39. It
provides:
The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separate special verdicts determining
the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
13

(Emphasis added.)
Based upon the Act's special definition of the word
"defendant", this section means that the special verdict form
will provide for an allocation of fault attributable to each
person or entity who is claimed to be a joint tort-feasor,
regardless of whether or not they are actually parties to the
lawsuit.

Any other interpretation of Section 39 as clarified by

the definition found in Section 37 ignores the clear language of
those sections and would violate Section 38 which limits each
party's liability to his own percentage of fault.
Plaintiff's claim that the Legislature reversed this
rule by the provisions of Section 78-27-41 is incorrect.

Section

41 provides that any party to the lawsuit may join as parties any
joint tort-feasors by filing a third party complaint that does
not seek dollar relief, but simply asks for apportionment.
section does not require such joinder.

The

There is nothing in

Section 41 that states that in the absence of such joinder, those
non-parties will be kept off of the special verdict form.

The

only section that deals with the special verdict form is Section
39 which directs their inclusion.
Plaintiff's argument that this literal interpretation
makes Section 41 mere surplusage is fallacious.

Section 41 gives

all parties to the lawsuit the ability to join joint tort-feasors
for the purpose of discovery and trial.
14

Each party can make a

strategic decision as to whether there is benefit or not in
joining such non-party joint tort-feasors.

For example, it may

be to a defendant's benefit to join the non-party in order to
facilitate the taking of depositions, obtaining documents, and
other discovery procedures it needs in order to prepare its case.
Additionally, a defendant may conclude that it would be of
assistance at trial to have them joined.

These are strategic

options which Section 41 gives to all parties to the lawsuit.
However, the giving of that option with the permissive word "may"
does not change the basic structure of Sections 37-39 which
provides for inclusion of all joint tort-feasors on the special
verdict form.
Plaintiff's argument ignores the realities of many
lawsuits.

For example, a particular joint tort-feasor may not be

subject to jurisdiction in Utah.

Nevertheless, under the

statutory scheme, a plaintiff may go ahead and sue those joint
tort-feasors who are subject to Utah jurisdiction.

The

defendants in such a case would not be precluded from having
fault allocated to the joint tort-feasor who is not subject to
Utah jurisdiction and therefore not a party.
The inclusion of non-parties on the verdict benefits
not only defendants but plaintiffs as well.
Equipment Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986).

Bode v. Clark
In the Bode case, the

Oklahoma court affirmed a plaintiff's right to include a non15

party on the special verdict form.

Plaintiff's concern was to

assure that his own fault was calculated at less than 50 percent.
The same concern will apply for plaintiffs in Utah cases.1
Utah's statutory language is unique but similar to the
statutes of a number of other states.

Generally, only those

states whose statutes specifically restrict the special verdict
"to all parties" will preclude non-parties from the verdict form.
Those state courts are constrained by the statutes passed by
their legislatures.

See, for example, Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d

603 (Ore. 1987); Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev.
1984) and National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v.
Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983).
relied upon by plaintiff in her brief.

These are the cases
They are all easily

distinguishable because of the restricted statutory language
utilized.
Cases from those states with statutes which, like
Utah's, do not specifically limit the special verdict form to the
1

For example, suppose that Plaintiff's fault was 40 percent,
Defendant A was 2 0 percent, Defendant B was 2 0 percent, and
Defendant C who is not subject to the court's jurisdiction is 2 0
percent. Under Section 78-27-38, if all joint tort-feasors are
included on the special verdict form, Plaintiff will recover 20
percent of her damages from Defendant A and 20 percent from
Defendant B. However, if Defendant C were not included on the
special verdict form because it was not a party to the lawsuit, the
fault would be evenly split between Plaintiff on the one hand and
Defendants A and B jointly on the other hand. As a result, under
Section 38, Plaintiff would recover nothing.
16

parties, support the rule of law that all joint tort-feasors
should be included on the special verdict form.

The rationale

was summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
We now adopt the rule which was suggested by
Tucker and Jensen which is clearly the
prevalent practice among state courts. "It
is established without doubt that when
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the
opportunity to consider the negligence of all
parties to the transaction, whether or not
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to
the other tort-feasors by operation of law or
because of a prior release." [Citation.]
"The reason for such a rule is that true
apportionment cannot be achieved unless that
apportionment includes all tort-feasors
guilty of causal negligence either causing or
contributing to the occurrence in question,
whether or not they are parties to the case."
[Citations.]
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West. Inc.. 621 P.2d 399
(Ida. 1980) at 403. (Emphasis added.)
See also,

DaFonte v. Up-Right. Inc.. 828 P.2d 140.

"Damages must be apportioned among *universe' of tort-feasors
including xnon-joined defendants'."

828 P.2d at 146; Dietz v.

General Electric Company. 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991); and
N.L. Industries. Inc.. 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1980).

Paul v.

". . . the

negligence of tort-feasors not parties to the lawsuit should be
considered by the trial jury in order to properly apportion the
negligence of those tort-feasors who are parties."
approva1:

Bode v. Clark Eguipment, Supra.

17

Cited with

The public policy supporting the consideration of fault
of non-parties is not new.

The concept and theory of comparative

fault requires full comparison with all tort-feasors, whether or
not they are parties.

This is particularly true when, as in

Utah, the defendants have no right of contribution.

Professor E.

Wayne Thode of the University of Utah Law School argued for such
consideration even under Utah's previous comparative negligence
statutes.

1973 Law Review, "Comparative Negligence, Contribution

Among Joint Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of a Release—A Triple
Play by the Utah Legislature", p. 406. Without the inclusion of
all tort-feasors on the verdict form, the comparative fault
analysis becomes distorted and illogical.
POINT III
THE ADDITION OF SALT LAKE CITY ON THE VERDICT
FORM DID NOT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff was aware from the time she received
defendant's Answers to Interrogatories in May of 1991 that
defendant was claiming that the stop sign in question was
obstructed by trees and foliage. (R. 14.)

Plaintiff's attorney

was present at the depositions of defendant and witness Rusk
which further elaborated on the nature of the obstruction.
Plaintiff was clearly aware that part of defendant's defense was
to claim that the stop sign was not properly visible.

Adding

Salt Lake City to the verdict form did not change the factual
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issue regarding obstruction of the stop sign whatsoever.

It was

an issue that plaintiff had been long familiar with.
In her brief on appeal, plaintiff has alleged that the
inclusion of Salt Lake City caused prejudice to her.
Judge Frederick properly found that no prejudice was
involved.

The inclusion of Salt Lake City did not change the

defense presented by defendant nor did it change or alter the
evidence.

The factual issue still remained as to whether the

stop sign was obstructed by foliage.
Plaintiff's brief has cited a number of cases regarding
amendment to pleadings.
pleadings.

In this case, there was no amendment of

There was no change of claim or defense.

Even if this matter were to be considered under the
standards regarding late amendments to pleadings, it is clear
that the trial judge was well within his discretion.

As cited by

plaintiff, in the case of Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d
1189 (Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals commented:
In considering a motion to amend, a trial
judge must decide ^whether the opposing side
would be put to unavoidable prejudice by
having an issue adjudicated for which he had
not had time to prepare.7 [Citation.]
Absent a clear abuse of discretion, this
court will not disturb a trial court's ruling
on a motion to amend.
746 P.2d at 1190.

(Emphasis added).

19

In this case, Judge Frederick found that plaintiff was
not having to adjudicate an issue for which she had not had time
to prepare.
a year.

She had known about the obstruction issue for almost

The facts not only support but compel Judge Frederick's

conclusion that plaintiff had shown no prejudice.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING
IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES AND WAS PROPERLY PRECLUDED FROM
BRINGING ON A SURPRISE WITNESS IN THE SECOND DAY OF TRIAL.
Plaintiff pushed this case to early trial.
53; 62-63.)

(R. 23; 52-

She represented that her discovery and investigation

were complete and ready for trial.
At the time the Court set trial at plaintiff's
insistence, the Court ordered that witness lists be exchanged by
February 14, 1992, 18 days prior to trial.

Plaintiff did not

comply with the Order but did file a designation of witnesses
five days late on February 19, 1992.
On the second day of trial, while plaintiff's case in
chief was still going forward, plaintiff advised the Court that
she had discovered a new witness, Mr. Nackling, and wished to
offer his testimony with regard to whether or not the stop sign
was obstructed.

Mr. Nackling had not been included on

plaintiff's witness list.

Plaintiff subsequently renewed her
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motion at the close of defendant's case, attempting to
characterize Mr. Nackling as a rebuttal witness.
Defendant objected.

Judge Frederick refused to permit

the witness to testify, stating:
. . . It has been the essential defense here
that the sign was obstructed, thereby
limiting the defendant's opportunity to
timely observe it and take appropriate
action. That aspect of the Geurts testimony
is not new, and my decision to allow Salt
Lake City on the verdict form for the
purposes of apportioning the responsibility
here really does not change the essential
defense that the sign was obstructed. The
claim here has been made that that was a fact
and evidence has been adduced, if it is
believable to the jury, that that was the
fact, and now at this point, this late date,
it seems to me it puts the [defendant] at an
unfair disadvantage, not knowing who this
individual is, and having had the opportunity
to cross examine or at least depose this
witness, while as Mr. Geurts was available
and notified in a timely fashion as far as
the opposition was concerned, that he would
be testifying. I am persuaded that it would
place the [defendant]5 in an unfair posture
to grant this motion and its denied.
(R. 744.)
Judge Frederick's ruling is consistent with orderly
litigation management and the particular facts of this case. It
was plaintiff's burden in presenting her case in chief to
demonstrate that defendant either failed to keep a proper lookout
2

Judge Frederick inadvertently said "plaintiff" rather than
"defendant." In subsequent discussion he clarified that he meant
to refer to defendant. (R. 744-745.)
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or failed to observe a stop sign.

Plaintiff was fully aware that

defendant was claiming that the stop sign was obstructed.

It was

part of plaintiff's case in chief to demonstrate that the stop
sign was there and observable.

She put on evidence to prove that

it was observable through her expert, Newell Knight, R. 398-403;
through the testimony of Officer Mickey F. Paul, R. 434) and
through her own testimony, (R. 608). For plaintiff to now claim
that the obstruction of the stop sign was "something new" raised
for the first time in defendant's portion of the case is
fallacious and Judge Frederick's ruling pointed out that fact.
In her brief, defendant takes great pains to attempt to
describe Mr. Nackling's testimony as "rebuttal" testimony.

As

such, she argues she should be exempt from the requirements of
the court order to designate witnesses and should have been able
to present Mr. Nackling.
proposition.

Even her own cases do not support this

She cites the case of Morgan v. Commercial Union

Assurance Companies, 606 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1979) in which the
Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to allow a witness
who was not listed in the court ordered designation of witnesses
to testify.

The court pointed out:

However that may be, a defense witness whose
purpose is to contradict an expected and
anticipated portion of plaintiff's case can
never be considered a "rebuttal witness" or
anything analogous to one.
606 F.2d at 556.
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In this case, Mr. Nackling's testimony was intended to
bolster plaintiff's case in chief on the obstruction issue and to
attack an "anticipated portion" of the defendant's case.
State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515 (Utah 1989) cited by
plaintiff stands for the same principle.

In that case, the Utah

Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision to allow a nonlisted rebuttal witness to testify.

But the holding was based

upon the fact that the defendant in the case had changed her
testimony at trial raising new facts. The court found that there
was "new" evidence that justified the new rebuttal testimony.

No

such new evidence was involved in this case.
In this case, the trial court refused to allow
plaintiff to bring on an undisclosed witness who would testify
regarding issues that were not new and that had been specifically
addressed in plaintiff's case in chief.

In such cases, appellate

courts uniformly uphold the decision of the trial court. See,
for example, Wirth v. Commercial Resources, Inc., 630 P.2d 292
(N.M. App. 1981).
Although defense counsel tried to
characterize Mr. Patterson's testimony as
"rebuttal" it was not such. As suggested in
the pretrial order, rebuttal witnesses are
those persons "the necessity of whose
testimony reasonably cannot be anticipated
before the time of trial." . . . Being part
of the planned defense, it was not rebuttal
evidence. The court did not err in refusing
to allow it.
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630 P.2d at 298; and Kremer v. Audett, 668 P.2d 1315 (Wa. App.
1983). (Emphasis added.)
Rebuttal evidence is admitted to enable the
plaintiff to answer a new matter presented by
the defense. [Citation]. Genuine rebuttal
evidence is not simply a reiteration of
evidence in chief but consists of evidence
offered in reply to new matters. The
plaintiff, therefore, is not allowed to
withhold substantial evidence supporting any
of the issues which it has the burden of
proving in its case in chief merely in order
to present this evidence cumulatively at the
end of defendant's case.
668 P.2d at 1317.

(Emphasis added.)

The Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in Utah and
most states of the United States are intended to provide each
party with full access to the other's case to avoid surprises at
trial.

To allow one side to use a witness that was not

revealed in violation of a court order jeopardizes the other
party's trial preparation and should not be permitted.

Kott v.

City of Phoenix, 763 P.2d 235 (Ariz. 1988).
The Utah Court of Appeals has not hesitated to uphold a
trial judge's ruling in excluding a witness who was not listed.
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989).

The court stated:

The trial court does not abuse its discretion
in refusing to admit evidence which is not
timely provided to the opposing party
contrary to the court's instructions.
Id. at p. 917.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's primary basis for this appeal has become
moot.

The jury found no fault on the part of the defendant.

The

issue of apportionment was not reached on the special verdict
form andf therefore, was of no consequence*

Even in the absence

of mootness, the inclusion of Salt Lake City on the verdict form
was mandated by the comparative negligence statutes and caused no
prejudice to plaintiff.
The trial court's exclusion of witness Nackling is
solidly supported by case law.

Plaintiff failed to list Mr.

Nackling on her court ordered designation of witnesses. Mr.
Nackling's testimony was addressed to one of the issues of
plaintiff's case in chief.

Judge Frederick's decision to exclude

Nackling was correct.
DATED this

day of ^ 7 / , ^ ^
RIC

ROBERT W

, 1993
, MILLER & NELSON

STEVES

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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